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Abstract
Using a novel nancial data-set which covers an extensive time period between 1995
to 2012, we test for the impact of currency denomination of bonds on Asian rms'
survival probabilities. Our data span two nancial crises: the 1997{98 Asian crisis
and the 2007{09 global nancial crisis. We nd that during the former crisis rms
with foreign currency denominated bonds face a higher probability of failure compared
to rms with domestic bonds. On the other extreme, we nd no notable dierences
between the 2007-09 nancial crisis and tranquil times for both domestic and foreign
issuers.
Key words: Firm survival, Bond nancing, Domestic and foreign currency debt,
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JEL: F32, F34, G15, E30; L20
1
1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that during hard times lenders are more likely to withhold funds
and interrupt lines of credit to less creditworthy rms forcing some of them to fail. The
recent global nancial crisis and the ensuing recession have spurred renewed interest in the
relationship between access to capital markets and the incidence of corporate failures. Becker
and Ivashina (2014) nd evidence of substitution from loans to bonds at times characterized
by contraction in bank lending supply and tight monetary policy. In the context of emerging
market economies, Bolton and Freixas (2008) argue that bond nancing, as a form of long-
term nance, does not expose rms to the risks of bank runs and systemic crises. While bank-
nanced rms are fully exposed to the risk of bank loans, bond-nanced rms are shielded
from the adverse eects of a nancial crisis and therefore are more likely to survive. In the
Asian region, one lesson learned from the Asian crisis in 1997{98 suggests that providing
access to well-developed bond markets could mitigate the negative eects of a nancial crisis.
Asia is potentially more prone to the adverse eects of foreign loan dependence due to the
low level of corporate debt securities outstanding. Asian countries have been aware of this
weakness since 1997 and have sought to develop their nancial markets.
Since the 1997{98 Asian nancial crisis, policymakers in the region have taken several
steps to develop and strengthen their bond markets. One of the most well known regional
initiatives was to establish an Asian Bond Fund to purchase dollar and local currency gov-
ernment bond issues (see Packer and Remolona (2012)). In particular, the ASEAN countries
have co-ordinated the issue and trading of sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds since 2003.
They have also improved the infrastructure as part of a wider Asian Bond Market Initiative
(ABMI) to create a more integrated regional market.
In this paper we assess the role of bond nance, considering the currency denomination
of bonds, in rm survival during extreme economic events. Our data spans the 1997{98
crisis as well as the 2007{09 crisis and hence it provides a natural experiment to explore
the impact of currency denomination of bonds over two dierent nancial crises. This paper
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seeks to determine whether the benecial impact of bond nance on rm survival holds when
we distinguish between rms with foreign and domestic bonds during the Asian crisis and
the recent global nancial crisis.
Our work is related to two dierent strands of literature. First, we build on the empirical
and theoretical literature that looks at the importance of nancial status and borrowing
constraints on rms' survival chances and concludes that rms in bad nancial shape are
more likely to fail (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)). Our work moves this literature forward by
examining the role of bond currency denomination. In addition, the present study dier-
entiates the eects of domestic and foreign bond nance across crises and tranquil periods.
This contribution speaks directly to the literature which has emphasized the important role
of macroeconomic environment in survival (see Alvarez and Gorg (2009) and Bhattcharjee
et al. (2009)).1
A second related line of work is the literature on the emerging economies nancial de-
velopment. According to Turner (2012), the development of the domestic corporate bond
market will help rms to better endure nancial crises and avoid currency mismatches. There
is also signicant evidence that rms increased cash stocks in Asia as a precautionary motive
to ensure investment and growth (Guariglia and Mizen (2012)). The progress of develop-
ment in Asia, especially for corporate bonds, has been rapid and steady since 2005, although
it is lacking in terms of depth and liquidity compared to Western counterparts (Genberg
and Sulstarova (2008), Packer and Remolona (2012) and Mizen and Tsoukas (2014)). In
our study we nd that access to domestic bond nance is one factor that could ameliorate
emerging markets crises and protect rms against failures. Hence, the promotion of deep
and liquid regional bond markets should be at the top of the policymakers' agenda.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section two illustrates the empirical
1Alvarez and Gorg (2009) oer evidence from Latin America and Bhattcharjee et al. (2009) from the
UK showing that changes in the macroeconomic environment may interact with relevant rm and industry
features in amplifying exit hazards.
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specications and the econometric methodology. In Section three we present a descriptive
analysis of our data. Section four presents the empirical evidence. Section ve concludes the
paper.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
The theoretical rationale for expecting an eect from rms' nancial position on their survival
prospects is well documented in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). In their model borrowing
constraints aect rm survival and this generates a role for capital structure in an asymmetric
information setup. In our empirical analysis we take on board these predictions and we also
consider the impact of access to bond markets on corporate failures. One basic premise of
this study is that access to bond nance is associated with the establishment of reputation in
the market. Companies with bond issues can directly tap the capital markets and therefore
may be able to replace bank funding with funds directly raised on nancial markets. In light
of the above discussion, our rst testable hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Access to a corporate bond market reduces rms' probability of bankruptcy.
Our motivation to examine the impact of currency denomination of bonds on corporate
failures stems from the fact that foreign currency liabilities played a crucial role in amplifying
the adverse eects of several crises in emerging markets (Bordo et al. (2010)). The idea of
foreign debt exposure is central in the above paper since the authors argue that in the face
of a sudden and large depreciation of exchange rates, reliance on foreign debt will make
private and public debt default more likely. One plausible question is whether being a bond
issuer in Asia was more of an advantage in attenuating failure hazards given that many rms
were relying on bonds denominated in foreign currency when the Asian crisis burst in 1997.
Therefore, we consider the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The currency denomination of a bond can have an (positive or negative)
impact on rms' probability of bankruptcy.
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The East Asian twin crisis (currency and banking crisis) is an ideal setting to study the
link between rms' survival and access to bond markets because during this period most
corporations were heavily dependent on domestic and foreign bank nance to supplement
internal funds for investment, with smaller and medium sized enterprizes almost exclusively
reliant on domestic bank loans. When the crisis erupted the funding to banks and then to
corporations fell dramatically, and in the absence of local corporate bond markets to provide
an alternative source of funding the eects of the crisis were amplied (Eichengreen et al.
(2006))2. After the devaluation of domestic currencies, indebted rms found it expensive to
repay their foreign currency denominated debt. This had a sharp adverse eect on invest-
ment, output and rms' chances of survival. Following the discussion above, we stipulate
the third hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3: During the Asian crisis rms that borrowed more heavily in foreign
currency are more likely to fail.
The global nancial crisis is a somewhat dierent story for the Asian region. Most
economists and policy makers agree that Asian economies were better prepared and insulated
against this crisis because they had adopted relatively conservative nancial policies after the
1997-98 Asian nancial crisis (Turner (2012)). In addition, Asian economies have adopted
a series of measures in order to develop and foster their domestic bond markets (see Burger
et al. (2010)). Specically, policy makers in the Asian region encouraged the expansion and
liquidity in the local bond markets by implementing several regulatory reforms (see Packer
and Remolona (2012)). The upshot is that the growth of the corporate bond market has
played a catalytic role in building resilience, reducing currency mismatches, and ultimately
providing a \spare tyre" for rms when banks interrupted their lines of credit3. In the
context of rm survival, we expect to nd that external shocks from advanced economies
were better weathered by Asian economies compared with the 1997-98 crisis. We therefore
2See Kaminsky and Pereira (1996) for more details on the Latin American crises.
3During the global nancial crisis, European banks were deleveraging, forcing some adjustment in corpo-
rate capital structure away from loans towards debt securities. This would suggest that banks changed their
risk appetite and became less tolerant of companies facing a high risk in the crisis.
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hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 4: The link between bond issuance and survival might not be signicantly
dierent in and out of the global nancial crisis.
Having developed the testable hypotheses for the present study, we now turn to the
empirical implementation.
3 Empirical strategy
Probit and hazard models are commonly used in the related empirical literature to model
corporate failures (e.g Zingales (1998); Bridges and Guariglia (2008); Alvarez and Gorg
(2009); Bhattcharjee et al. (2009) and Tsoukas (2011)). However, these models do not
account for potential endogenous regressors and this is likely to be of particular importance
in the bond issuance context.4 For example, it is likely that rms' desire to access the bond
market is linked to certain balance sheet characteristics that reect rm quality and survival
is correlated with these characteristics. Similar arguments can also be made regarding the
potential endogeneity of the other rm-level variables such as rms' leverage. We address this
issue by allowing our bond nancing variables and rm-specic indicators to be endogenous
and then instrumenting for them through a two-stage procedure. Our approach to employ
instrumental variable techniques (IV probit) is formally justied by using a Wald test of
exogeneity. We report p-values of the test at the foot of the tables of results. In all cases
the Wald test emphatically rejects the null of exogeneity in our regressors vindicating our
endogenous approach.
The identication of the impact of bond nancing requires the availability of exogenous
instruments that are correlated with bond issues, but do not directly aect rm survival.
We propose that two variables{the Chin-Itto index and the distance to the closest major
nancial center (New York, Hong Kong, London){ can provide a plausible exogenous source
4As it has been emphasized for linear models, endogeneity in binary choice models results in biased
coecients and, therefore, incorrect inferences (Maddala (1983) and Rivers and Vuong (1988)).
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of variation in the bond issuance probability. To begin with, the Chinn-Ito Index is used
to measure nancial liberalisation and nancial openness which provides an incentive for
investors to hold foreign assets in order to increase gains from diversication. Thus nancial
openness is likely to encourage bond issuance (see Mizen et al. (2012)). Second, closer
physical distance to major centers of nancial activity would promote nancial integration
and may encourage rms to issue bonds directly by reducing their issuance costs, lowering the
cost of entering and exiting the market for investors and providing easier access to domestic
rms that typically face thresholds that bar their entry to international bond markets (Mizen
et al. (2012) and Mizen and Tsoukas (2014)). To the extent that the nancial openness index
and physical distance of the markets inuence rms' ability to issue corporate bonds, they
provide reasonable exogenous instruments for rm's access to bond markets. On the other
hand, it can be argued that the above variables do not impact directly on rm survival.
As well as instrumenting bond nance, we instrument for our nancial variables. The
instrument set for the rm-specic variables includes lagged values of size, leverage, prof-
itability, investment and collateral. It is generally agreed that lagged variables (which are
often referred to as `internal' instruments) are distributed independently of the error process
and that they are suciently correlated with the included endogenous regressors. Hence
they are frequently used as instruments in the literature.5 We employ the Sargan and the
Anderson test statistics, obtained from a linear instrumental variables model, to check for
the validity and the relevance of the proposed instruments.
To assess the importance of bond currency denomination in inuencing rm survival we
estimate the following model:
Pr(FAILit = 1) = F (a0+a1ISSUERit+a2FINit+a3SIZEit+a4AGEit+a5GDPt+vj+vc+it)
(3.1)
5See for example Almeida et al. (2010) who show that IV estimators that make use of `internal' instruments
are very eective in controlling for measurement error in the regressors.
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where FAIL is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the company's status is that of dead,
and 0 otherwise. The subscript i identies rms, and the subscript t, time. F (.) denotes the
standard normal distribution function. The error term is made up by three components. vj
is an industry-specic eect, which we take into account by including industry dummies that
control for xed eects across industries. vc stands for the country-specic eect, which we
control for by including country dummies that control for institutional dierences between
countries. Finally, it is an idiosyncratic error term.
The major interest in this paper is the impact of bond nancing, which oers rms the
option of an alternative source of nancing. ISSUER is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if a rm has issued a bond in the past (and the bond did not mature as of year t),
and 0 otherwise. In addition, we are able from the data to make the distinction between
rms that issue bonds in foreign currency and those that make local currency bond issues.
Therefore, we construct the dummy DOMESTIC which takes the value 1 if a rm has
issued a domestic bond, and 0 otherwise and the dummy FOREIGN which takes the value
1 if rm has issued a foreign bond, and 0 otherwise. The reference (base) category is the
NON -ISSUER dummy which takes the value 1 if rm i has never issued a bond throughout
the sample period, and 0 otherwise. As an alternative to foreign bond debt, we employ the
long-term debt percent (LTD).
At the next stage, Equation (3.1) is modied to include interactions between bond is-
suers (both domestic and foreign) with a crisis dummy to show variations in rms' survival
prospects for crisis and non-crisis periods. We consider the following model:
Pr(FAILit = 1) = F (a0+a1DOMESTICit+a2FOREIGNit+a3DOMESTICitCRISISt
+ a4FOREIGNit  CRISISt + a5CRISISt + a6FINit + a7SIZEit + a8AGEit + a9GDPt
+ vj + vc + it) (3.2)
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We account for the Asian nancial crisis using CRISIS= ASCD that takes the value
1 in years 1997{98 and 0 otherwise to allow for the the fact that the second half of 1997
saw an unprecedented collapse of the stock markets and currencies of ve Asian economies
Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand with secondary eects through
the rest of Asia. We also consider the global nancial crisis employing CRISIS= GFCD
that takes the value 1 in years 2007{09 and zero otherwise to determine the impact of the
most recent crisis on corporate failures.6 This test is motivated by the argument of Bolton
and Freixas (2008), that bond-nanced rms are shielded from the direct eect of a nancial
crisis. The sign and signicance of the interacted terms will reveal whether the impact of
bond nance on rm survival diers between tranquil and turbulent periods.
3.1 Financial characteristics
In the vector FIN we consider four dimensions of nancial health from the balance sheet,
namely leverage, protability, liquidity and collateral assets. Considering the likely response
of leverage (LEV ERAGE), as measured by the rm's long-term debt to total assets, we
remark that high levels of existing debt are associated with a worse balance sheet situation,
which would increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and lead to the inability
of rms to obtain external nance at a reasonable cost (see Levin et al. (2004)). Zingales
(1998), Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Tsoukas (2011) show that highly leveraged carri-
ers, start-ups and domestic rms are less likely to survive. We expect therefore a positive
relationship between leverage and the probability of failure.
The next nancial component is a protability ratio (PROFITABILITY ) dened as
the ratio of the rm's prots before interests and tax to its total assets. Following Bunn and
Redwood (2003) Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Tsoukas (2011), we use this measure to
proxy for the rm's ability to generate prots. We anticipate a positive relationship between
6To avoid overlap between \normal times" and credit crunch periods, we exclude the 2007-09 years from
the Asian crisis dummy and the 1997-98 years from the global crisis dummy. We obtain robust results.
8
protability and the likelihood of survival.
We also control for the rm's nancing needs (INV ESTMENT ), as measured by the
ratio of investments over sales. This variable measures investment opportunities and we
expect a positive association between investment and the probability of rm survival.
As an additional nancial indicator we include a measure of tangible assets, which indi-
cates the rm's ability to pledge collateral for debt nance (COLLATERAL). Firms can
raise external nance by pledging the underlying productive assets as collateral.In the event
that the rm reneges on its debt, creditors will seize those assets. Collateral has also been
found to aect rms' chances of survival. Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Tsoukas (2011)
document that rms with a larger fraction of tangibles in their balance sheets are more
likely to survive for a longer period of time. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between
collateral and the incidence of failure.
3.2 Other inuences
In addition to nancial characteristics, our specications include a choice of control vari-
ables guided by the existing empirical and theoretical literature on the determinants of rm
survival. It is recognized that a rm's size plays an important role in determining rm fail-
ure, (Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)), and is expected to decrease the incidence of failure.
Large rms tend to face lower barriers in accessing the capital markets, while smaller rms
with more severe information problems tend to face a higher risk of insolvency and illiq-
uidity and consequently a higher risk of failure (Mata and Portugal (1994); Audretsch and
Mahmood (1995) and Dunne et al. (1998)). Hence, we introduce size (SIZE) measured as
the logarithm of the rm's real total assets.
Firm AGE is measured by the number of years elapsed since the rm's rst Initial Public
Oering (IPO). This is done in line with prior studies that measure rm age using the number
of years since listening (see for example Shumway (2001) and Fama and French (2004)).
Firms with an established track record are less likely to fail than those that are younger
9
because they are usually more able to withstand past economic and nancial downturns and
therefore face a smaller liquidation risk.
We also attempt to control for macroeconomic and industry-specic conditions in our
models. To this end we control for macroeconomic eects by adding the growth in GDP. We
expect the GDP growth (GDP ) to be negatively associated with the rm's probability to
fail.
4 Data
4.1 Data description
The data for this paper are drawn from dierent sources including Compustat Global,
Bloomberg, Zephyr, the Bank for International Settlements and the Asian Development
Bank. These are combined in a new way to cast light on the probability of failure in the
Asian region. The data are recorded on an annual basis and cover rms in emerging Asia
most aected by the 1997-98 crisis - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
The time period is 1995 through 2012, which covers the period of the East Asian crisis and
the most recent global nancial crisis.
The Compustat Global database oers balance sheet and prot and loss accounts data
for rms in the East Asian region. We provide information on nancial accounts and ratios
for Asian rms operating in all sectors of the economy. The data on bond issues are drawn
from Bloomberg. Our coverage of bond issues therefore embraces both rms with issues
in hard currencies, which are almost exclusively US dollar denominated, and rms with
local currency denominated bonds. Before the Asian crisis, issuance in domestic bonds by
corporations was very limited but in the post-Asian crisis period it increased markedly (see
Mizen et al. (2012)). In our data 59% of bonds are denominated in domestic currency and
the remaining 41% in foreign currency. The use of such a unique dataset will enable us to
scrutinize the role of bond nance in survival. Data on the real eective exchange rates,
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which are meant to proxy for changes in the macroeconomy, are taken from the Bank for
International Settlements.
We use Zephyr to obtain data on mergers and acquisitions for the sampled rms. Compu-
stat Global reports rms as `dead' but it may be possible that some rms could be recorded as
`dead' not because they failed but because they merged with another rm instead. Employ-
ing Zephyr we are able to identify and drop those rms that are mistakenly coded as `dead'
in our data. This will ensure that our dependent variable has been accurately constructed
to capture rms that failed and did not exit the sample due to mergers and acquisitions.7
Data on our exogenous instruments for bond nancing are taken from two dierent
sources. First, the Chinn-Ito measure is a combination of four binary dummy variables
published in IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER). Second, we obtain data from Rose and Spiegel (2009) on the physical distance
of a country from nancial activity in order to measure the proximity to major international
nancial centers (New York, Hong Kong, London).
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, we control for the potential
inuence of outliers, by excluding observations in the 1 percent from upper and lower tails
of the distribution of the regression variables. Our combined sample contains data for 446
rms in Indonesia, 1,612 in Korea, 1,219 in Malaysia, 848 in Singapore and 644 in Thailand,
a total of 4,769 rms.
4.2 Sample analysis
By way of preliminary analysis, we show the evolution of failures over time in Figure 1.
This gure shows that our sample is dominated by rms that failed in 1997 which coincided
with the onset of the Asian crisis and 1998 which marked the end of the crisis. Apart from
this period the distribution of failures over time is reasonably stable. During the 2007{09
7it should be noted that some mergers and acquisitions, especially those of nancial companies, involve
rms near bankruptcy being handed over to other rms using the form of mergers and acquisitions. These
rms actually failed, but the regulatory authorities sometimes use mergers and acquisitions as means of
resolution.
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crisis we are unable to detect any signicant increases in the number of corporate failures.
We conrm, therefore, the idea that Asian companies entered the global nancial crisis
with limited exposure to subprime-related instruments, and most had relatively healthy
nancial positions and strong capital buers. Moreover, the currencies of these countries
were protected by large foreign exchange reserves, lowering the currency risk of investors in
these countries.
In Figure 2 we depict the number of bond issues broken down by domestic and foreign
currency over the sample period. This gure tells a tale consistent with the bond market
development in Asia, and the variation through the two crises. It is clear that during the early
years of the sample, and especially during the Asian crisis, most bonds were denominated in
foreign currency. In the post-crisis period, domestic bond issues took o, before the Asian
Bond Fund Initiatives in 2003 (see Mizen et al. (2012), Packer and Remolona (2012) and
Mizen and Tsoukas (2014)), while the foreign bond issuance also increased from 2001 (albeit
not signicantly so). We also observe that domestic bonds expanded considerably during
the 2007{09 crisis, while at around the same time the foreign market seemed to atten.
Summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis are provided in Table
1. Means and standard deviations of the rm-specic variables and nancial indicators are
presented for the total sample (column 1) and for failed and surviving rms (columns 2
and 3). Further, the p-values of a test for the equality of means are presented in column
4. Regarding the nancial variables, surviving rms are less indebted and display higher
levels of protability and collateral. This supports the notion put forward by a number of
studies (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)
and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)) that rms which display healthier balance sheets are less
likely to fail. In addition, we observe that surviving rms are larger than failed rms. This
nding implies that rm size is an important determinant in business failures and is in line
with the previous empirical and theoretical research, which shows that the probability of
exit decreases with rm size and age (e.g Jovanovic (1982) and Clementi and Hopenhayn
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(2006)). Further, surviving rms are more likely to be bond issuers and to hold foreign long-
term debt. These dierences between sub-samples are statistically signicant in all cases but
one.
In Table 2 we present statistics for the main variables distinguishing between the two
crises periods. It is evident that the average failure rate is higher during the Asian crisis
compared to tranquil times. In terms of its magnitude the average failure rate during the
nal years of our sample is much smaller than it is around the time of the Asian crisis. In
addition, we show that overall rms displayed worse balance sheet characteristics during the
Asian nancial crisis than the other years in the sample.
In summary, these preliminary statistics show that rms' failure rates are related to
bond nance, nancial healthiness and the two nancial crises. In the sections that follow
we provide formal econometric analysis of the determinants of rm failures, the eect of
nancial crisis, and the role of bond nancing. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these
statistical ndings are conrmed when we control for a number of factors which are known
to play a role in survival models.
5 Results
5.1 Main results
The East Asian nancial system suered severe damages during the 1997{98 crisis primarily
due to the underdeveloped bond market and the weak banking sector. As already mentioned,
companies with market exposure are likely to have established track record reputation. If
reputational eects are in play, we should expect to nd bond issuers to be less likely to fail,
everything else equal.
Table 3 presents estimates of Equation (3.1) reporting the marginal eects obtained from
the endogenous probit regressions. In column 1 of Table 3 we report the direct impact
of bond nance using the ISSUER dummy variable. We observe that the bond issuance
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dummy has a signicant negative marginal eect. Hence, issuing a bond exerts a negative
impact on the likelihood of failure. This nding is not only statistically but also economically
important. Changing the rm status from non-issuer to bond issuer would reduce the exit
probability by 2.7%.
Financial indicators have the expected impact on rms' chances of failure. In particular,
rms with high levels of LEV ERAGE face higher probabilities of failure compared to those
with low leverage conrming previous reported empirical evidence (Zingales (1998)). High
levels of debt would increase moral hazard and asymmetric information problems, and would
lead to a higher probability of failure. The eect is economically important since a one
percent increase in leverage would raise the probability of failure by 14.1%.
Next, PROFITABILITY measures the extent to which high-protable rms face a
lower risk of failure. It enters with the expected negative sign implying that an increase
in protability ratio lowers the hazard of failure. This result is consistent with previous
ndings which show that more protable rms are less likely to fail (Bunn and Redwood
(2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Tsoukas (2011)). A one percent increase in rms'
prots would decrease failure rates by 15.9%.
COLLATERAL and INV ESTMENT both have negative eects on the probability of
failure. Firms with higher level of investment opportunities are able to obtain more external
funding but also to pursue risk-shifting strategies (Bridges and Guariglia (2008)). This
eect is meaningful since raising collateral and investment by one percent would reduce the
incidence of failure by 2.8% and 4.3%, respectively.
With respect to our control variables, the results on SIZE and AGE indicate that larger
and older rms are less likely to fail, although the real impact is rather small. Further, the
proxy for the macroeconomic condition (GDP ) has the expected negative eect on failure.
In column 2 of Table 3, we make the distinction between rms with domestic and foreign
bond issues. We observe that both domestic and foreign dummies attain negative and
signicant marginal eects conrming our previous nding. In other words, rms with
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bond issues, irrespective of the currency denomination, are less likely to fail compared to
non-issuers. We view this result as signaling the `track record' reputation that rms can
establish in the bond market. Firms that are able to borrow through the issuance of bond
debt are those that can bear the signicant xed costs of accessing the bond market (such
as disclosure costs and underwriting fees). On the other hand, non-issuing rms, which are
more informationally opaque and lack track record, are more likely to fail. This empirical
result supports the argument of good reputation established through bond issuance.8 The
marginal eects suggest that changing the dummy of non-issuer to either domestic or foreign
would reduce the probability of failure by 4.8% and 14.3%, respectively.
Both equations have satisfactory diagnostics, showing instrument validity (Sargan) and
relevance (Anderson).
5.2 Currency denomination and the two nancial crises
5.2.1 The Asian nancial crisis
Having established the link between domestic and foreign bond issuers and rm survival, we
now explore the role of bond currency denomination in rm survival during crisis periods.
We anticipate the denomination of bonds in foreign currency to be of particular importance
during the Asian crisis, since during this period most corporations were heavily dependent
on foreign debt.
In column 1 of Table 4 we present interactions of bond dummies with the Asian crisis
period.9 We show that the marginal eects on domestic bonds are negative and signicant
during tranquil and crisis periods. Firms issuing bonds denominated in domestic currency
face a lower hazard of failure both in and outside the crisis. This empirical result conrms
8Given that bond nance is not the only available option for rms' external nance, one concern is that
other sources such as equity nance, bank nance and trade credit may have a central place in determining
business failures. In unreported regressions we nd that adding controls for the numbers of years since the
rms's equity IPO, bank dependency and trade credit does not alter the eect of bond nancing on rm
survival.
9The interactions gauge the change in the response to bond nancing variables for the crisis and non-crisis
years.
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the view taken by Bolton and Freixas (2008) that bond issuers are shielded from the eect
of a nancial crisis. Yet, we show that this is the case only for rms with domestic bonds.
By contrast, the marginal eects on rms with foreign bonds are negative and signicant
outside the crisis, but positive and signicant during the Asian crisis. This striking result
shows that rms with foreign bond issues were fully exposed to the Asian crisis and had a
particular problem during this period since debts became much more burdensome when the
exchange rate collapsed. The devaluation of the asset side of the rm's balance sheet relative
to its liabilities pushes the rm into failure. In other words, when a rm borrows in foreign
currency in the form of either loans or bonds and the local currency of the country where
the rm's main income comes from weakens, the debt repayment burden of the rm in local
currency upon maturity increases, which could increase the probability of rm failure. In
addition to the interaction terms, the dummy on the Asian crisis (ASCD) is positive and
signicant indicating that during this period rms were more likely to fail.
The ndings discussed above are seemingly at odds with those obtained in Allayannis
et al. (2003) regarding the impact of foreign currency debt on rm performance. Specically,
Allayannis et al. (2003) nd that nancial/operating performance does not respond more
strongly to the use of foreign currency debt compared to local currency debt. They also show
that rms which rely more heavily on foreign currency debt experienced an increase in sales
during the Asian crisis. However, as noted by the authors, these results are not in line with
prior research and they are \contrary to suggestions that foreign currency debt is associated
with underperformance". Moreover, they attempt to attribute these counterintuitive results
to the potential role of the derivatives markets during the currency crisis. Unfortunately,
however, data on derivatives at the rm level are not available within our data-set, so we are
unable to test for these eects directly. In short, we argue that our ndings mostly concur
with previous research which suggests that rms which are exposed to foreign debt perform
poorly and that the foreign debt exposure may be partly responsible for the Asian crisis (see
Chang and Velasco (1999) and Harvey and Roper (1999)).
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Financial indicators and other controls have the expected impact on rms' chances of
failure, indicating that rms in good nancial health are less likely to fail. Finally, the
diagnostic tests conrm the validity and the relevance of our instruments.
5.2.2 The global nancial crisis
We now turn our attention to the most recent global nancial crisis. In column 2 of Table
4 we report interactions of domestic and foreign bond dummies with the Global nancial
crisis period (GFCD). In contrast to the results obtained above, it appears that there is no
statistically signicant dierence in the link between bond nance and survival in and out of
the crisis. For both crisis and non-crisis periods rms with domestic and foreign bond debt
face lower exit probabilities. In other words, the negative and insignicant marginal eects
on the interaction of domestic and foreign issuers with the crisis dummy indicate that the
survival prospects of bond issuers were not signicantly aected during the 2007{09 crisis.
This suggests that bond issuance, as a measure of alternative source of funding, improves a
rm's survival probabilities, irrespective of whether a rm is faced with the 2007-09 crisis or
other times.
The dummy on the Global nancial crisis period (GFCD) is positive and signicant
although its impact on rm failure is quantitatively smaller compared to the Asian cri-
sis. We conclude that the external shocks emanating from advanced economies were better
weathered by Asian economies during 2009 compared with the 1997-98 Asian crisis. This
nding lends support to the idea that Asian rms were in better nancial shape by following
conservative nancial policies (see Turner (2012)). Moreover, domestic bond markets were
signicantly developed (see Burger et al. (2010)) and hence currency mismatches were dra-
matically reduced. In addition, we note that the remaining control variables retain their sign
and signicance indicating the importance of rms' nancial shape in determining corporate
failures. Once again, the diagnostic tests do not suggest any problems with the validity and
the relevance of our instruments.
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In summary, the results in this table emphasise the dierential eects of the two nancial
crises on survival probabilities for rms with domestic and foreign denominated bonds. Firms
with foreign bonds were more likely to fail during the Asian crisis, while rms issuing domestic
bonds were shielded from the adverse eects of the crisis. When we examine the recent
nancial crisis, we are unable to nd any notable dierences between domestic and foreign
bond issuers and hence we conclude that both types of bond issuers were less likely to fail.
It is worth mentioning that the muted response of rm survival to variations of debt may
be attributed to a number of dierent factors. For example, it could be that macroeconomic
conditions were dierent this time, or that exchange rate moves were less dramatic. One
might also argue that policy initiatives adopted in the region played a role in making the
eects of the crisis less potent. It may also be the case that rms with foreign currency
debt were better hedged. While we attempt to control for macroeconomic conditions using
the growth in GDP and for country-specic eects using country dummies, we have not
explicitly accounted for exchange rate movements. In the next sub-section, we investigate
the role of exchange rate volatility during extreme economic events. As already mentioned,
ideally, we would also like to test for potential hedging at the rm level, but due to data
limitations we are unable to conduct this test.
5.2.3 Exchange rate volatility
One important argument made so far is that depreciation of the local currency makes bor-
rowing more expensive and this may increase rms' exit probabilities. This is a dominant
channel which is likely to be operative during the Asian crisis when the exchange rate col-
lapsed. To further strengthen our nding presented in Table 4, column 1 (i.e that foreign
bond issuers are more likely to fail during the Asian twin crisis), we interact our domestic
and foreign bonds with a measure of exchange rate volatility (V OL).10 This provides a way
10We use the Real Exchange Rate (REER) taken from the BIS. Using monthly real exchange rate series,
a GARCH (1,1) model is implemented and the monthly measures are annualised to match the frequency of
the panel data.
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to explicitly assess the direct impact of currency depreciation on corporate failures.
We report estimation results in Table 5. We nd that the interaction term of foreign bond
and exchange rate volatility is positive and signicant. This is an important result, consid-
ering the arm's length nature of bond nance and the prevalence of uninformed investors.
This veries that the `exchange rate volatility' channel is very inuential in determining the
probability of failure, especially for bonds denominated in foreign currency. In other words,
the crisis eect is really an exchange rate collapse eect. On the other hand, we nd that
the interaction between domestic bonds and volatility is insignicant and statistically unim-
portant. Finally, the impact of the variables discussed in the previous section is very similar
in magnitude and level of signicance and in the interest of space we do not discuss them
here.
5.2.4 An alternative measure of debt
Thus far, we have employed dummy variables to indicate the use of foreign or domestic bonds.
Given the rm-level nature of our data-set, we attempt to make use of a richer measure that
takes into account the amount of long-term when a rm is categorised as foreign/domestic
issuer. In line with Allayannis et al. (2003), we construct the ratios of long-term debt to total
debt for domestic and foreign issuers and then take the dierence of the above measures.
We reproduce the main results replacing the foreign/domestic dummies with the the long-
term debt percent variable (Ltd) to gauge the response of rm survival to dierences in the
percentage of foreign debt.
Table 6 illustrates the results when we consider the dierence in the long-term debt
percent on its own. Our ndings are in line with previously reported results in Table 3. In
particular, we nd in column 1 that the long-term debt percent variable is negatively signed
and statistically signicant at the 1% level. Hence, rms which rely more heavily in foreign
debt tend to experience a higher probability of failure. We also nd in columns 2 and 3 that
the eects are more pronounced for the Asian crisis. Finally, results presented in column 4
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are comparable with those in Table 5. Thus we can conclude that our results are robust to
an alternative measure of debt exposure.
6 Conclusion
Corporate failures are typically higher during economic downturns, but the recent nancial
crisis and the ensuing recession have spurred renewed interest in the relationship between
access to capital markets and the incidence of failures. Using a novel nancial data-set which
covers an extensive time period between 1995 to 2012 we are able to cover two nancial crises:
the 1997{98 Asian crisis and the 2007{09 global nancial crises. We ask whether access to
bond nance, and in particular to domestic or foreign bonds, was benecial for rms during
crisis periods compared to tranquil times.
We nd that rms issuing either foreign or domestic corporate bonds are less likely to
fail compared to non-issuers. In addition, we show that the currency denomination of bonds
aects signicantly dierent the survival chances of rms during the Asian crisis, with foreign
bond issuers facing a higher probability of failure and domestic issuers being unaected. On
the other hand, it appears that there is no statistically signicant dierence in the link
between domestic and foreign bond nance and survival during the global nancial crisis.
Our results have important policy implications. If access to domestic bond nance is
one factor that could ameliorate emerging markets crises and protect rms against failures,
then the promotion of deep and liquid regional bond markets should be at the top of the
policymakers' agenda. All of these developments will spur the bond market and create
conditions for a more diversied and ecient nancial sector.
Further research on the inuence of bond market development is warranted since the
results reported here pool investment and speculative grade bonds. It is possible that certain
segments of the corporate bond market may have responded more favorably than others to
the increase in market size and liquidity, especially in crisis years. These distinctions are on
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the agenda for future research.
Appendix
Structure of the panel
Number of observations per rm Frequency Percent Cumulative
(1) (2) (3)
1 194 0.44 0.44
2 904 2.07 2.52
3 726 1.66 4.18
4 1,120 2.57 6.75
5 1,390 3.19 9.94
6 1,902 4.36 14.30
7 1,855 4.25 18.55
8 2,144 4.92 23.46
9 2,592 5.94 29.41
10 3,440 7.89 37.29
11 2,464 5.65 42.94
12 2,484 5.69 48.64
13 2,548 5.84 58.48
14 2,674 6.13 60.61
15 3,135 7.19 67.80
16 5,232 11.99 79.79
17 3,757 8.61 88.40
18 5,058 11.60 100.00
Total 43,619 100
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Correlation matrix
Leverage Protability Investment Collateral Size Age Issuer GDP
Leverage 1.000
Profitability -0.067 1.000
Investment -0.009 -0.127 1.000
Collateral 0.301 0.006 -0.078 1.000
Size 0.241 0.043 -0.063 0.106 1.000
Age 0.026 -0.041 -0.002 -0.025 -0.022 1.000
Issuer 0.075 0.036 -0.018 0.008 0.057 0.077 1.000
GDP -0.001 -0.042 -0.025 -0.033 -0.034 0.171 0.008 1.000
Notes: The table presents the correlation coecients between regressors.
Denitions of the variables
 Fail: is a dummy that equals 1 if a rm has failed, and 0 otherwise.
 Issuer: is a dummy that equals 1 if a rm has issued a bond, and 0 otherwise.
 Domestic: is a dummy that equals 1 if a rm has issued a local currency bond, and 0 otherwise.
 Foreign: is a dummy that equals 1 if a rm has issued a foreign currency denominated bond, and 0
otherwise.
 Ltd: is the long-term debt percent. It is calculated by taking the dierence in the ratios of long-term
debt to total debt for local and foreign currency respectively.
 V ol: is the exchange rate volatility calculated using a GARCH (1,1) model.
 Leverage: is measured as the rm's long-term debt to total assets.
 Profitability: is the ratio of the rm's prots before interest and tax to its total assets.
 Investment: is the ratio of the rm's investments over sales.
22
 Collateral: is dened as the ratio of the rm's tangible assets over its total assets.
 Size: is denoted by the log of real total assets.
 Age: is the number of years elapsed since the rm's rst Initial Public Oering.
 GDP : is the growth in GDP.
 ASCD: is a dummy that equals 1 in years 1997-98, and 0 otherwise.
 GFCD: is a dummy that equals 1 in years 2007-09, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Total sample Fail=1 Fail=0 Di.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fail 0.116 1.00 0.000 -
(0.32) (0.00) (0.00)
Leverage 0.091 0.097 0.091 0.003
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Profitability 0.049 0.033 0.050 0.000
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Investment 0.164 0.167 0.163 0.266
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17)
Collateral 0.349 0.348 0.358 0.016
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Size 7.49 2.813 8.117 0.000
(26.16) (12.41) ( 27.41)
Age 10.884 10.614 10.893 0.592
(9.58) (9.14) ( 9.98)
Issuer 0.202 0.164 0.207 0.000
(0.40) (0.37) (0.40)
Ltd 0.056 0.041 0.058 0.000
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16)
Observations 29279 3420 25859
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Fail is a dummy that equals 1 if
rm i fails in year t, and 0 otherwise. Leverage is measured as the rm's long-term debt to assets ratio. Profitability is the
ratio of the rm's prots before interest and tax to its total assets. Investment is dened by the ratio of investments over total
sales. Collateral is dened as the ratio of the rm's tangible assets over its total assets. Size is denoted by the log of real
assets. Age is the number of years elapsed since the rm's rst IPO. Issuer: is a dummy that equals 1 if the rm is a bond
issuer, and 0 otherwise. Ltd: is the long-term debt percent. Variables are measured in thousands of US dollars.
28
Table 2: Statistics for the two nancial crises
ASCD=1 ASCD=0 Di. GFCD=1 GFCD=0 Di.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fail 0.229 0.113 0.000 0.088 0.126 0.000
(0.42) (0.31) (0.28) (0.33)
Leverage 0.139 0.090 0.000 0.085 0.093 0.000
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Profitability 0.043 0.048 0.056 0.048 0.047 0.851
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Investment 0.175 0.163 0.032 0.164 0.164 0.987
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Collateral 0.347 0.411 0.000 0.325 0.357 0.000
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Size 15.33 7.24 0.000 6.875 7.706 0.017
(40.49) (25.51) (25.82) (26.27)
Age 8.135 11.044 0.000 12.025 10.859 0.000
(9.51) (9.61) (8.87) (9.62)
Issuer 0.206 0.196 0.203 0.192 0.205 0.022
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40)
Ltd 0.056 0.043 0.023 0.037 0.046 0.001
(0.20) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18)
Observations 932 28347 7349 21930
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ASCD: is a dummy that equals
1 in years 1997-98, and 0 otherwise. GFCD: is a dummy that equals 1 in years 2007-09, and 0 otherwise. Also, see notes to
Table 1.
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Table 3: Currency denomination of bonds and rm survival
Bond nance Bond currency denomination
(1) (2)
Issuer -0.027***
(-3.90)
Domestic -0.048**
(-2.10)
Foreign -0.143***
(-5.52)
Leverage 0.141*** 0.125***
(5.35) (5.15)
Profitability -0.159*** -0.174***
(-3.66) (-3.95)
Investment -0.043** -0.058*
(-2.13) (-1.85)
Collateral -0.028** -0.038**
(-2.05) (-2.46)
Size -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.75) (-4.28)
Age -0.001*** -0.003***
(-5.92) (-4.22)
GDP -0.0001* -0.001***
(-1.96) (4.95)
Observations 21,438 21,438
P   values of
test statistics
Wald 0.019 0.019
Anderson 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.412 0.365
Notes: Marginal eects of endogenous probit models are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a
rm fails in year t, and zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant
at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Also, see notes to Table 1.
30
Table 4: Currency denomination of bonds and rm survival over two nancial crises
Asian crisis Global nancial crisis
(1) (2)
Domestic -0.042* -0.021***
(-2.01) (-3.70)
Foreign -0.154*** -0.094**
(-5.49) (-2.32)
Domestic*ASCD -0.260**
(-2.31)
Foreign*ASCD 0.351**
(2.26)
ASCD 0.061***
(5.53)
Domestic*GFCD -0.233
(-1.18)
Foreign*GFCD -0.265
(-1.04)
GFCD 0.015*
(1.92)
Leverage 0.157*** 0.137***
(5.55) (6.02)
Profitability -0.171*** -0.234***
(-3.82) (-6.33)
Investment -0.029** -0.089*
(-2.22) (-1.85)
Collateral -0.071** -0.021
(-2.26) (-1.45)
Size -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.00) (-7.39)
Age -0.001** -0.001***
(-2.38) (-4.22)
GDP -0.001*** -0.001***
(8.24) (7.54)
Observations 21,438 21,438
P   values of
test statistics
Wald 0.009 0.010
Anderson 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.256 0.489
Notes: Marginal eects of endogenous probit models are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a
rm fails in year t, and zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant
at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Also, see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 5: Exchange rate volatility and rm survival
Domestic -0.033**
(-2.35)
Foreign -0.064*
(-1.82)
Domestic*V ol -0.001
(-1.41)
Foreign*V ol 0.085***
(2.89)
Leverage 0.138***
(5.20)
Profitability -0.133***
(-3.05)
Investment -0.059***
(-2.73)
Collateral -0.026*
(-1.89)
Size -0.001***
(-4.62)
Age -0.001***
(-5.05)
V ol 0.0001*
(1.68)
GDP -0.001*
(1.74)
Observations 21,438
P   values of
test statistics
Wald 0.000
Anderson 0.005
Sargan 0.375
Notes: Marginal eects of endogenous probit models are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a
rm fails in year t, and zero otherwise. V ol: is the exchange rate volatility calculated using a GARCH (1,1) model. Robust
z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Also, see notes
to Tables 1.
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Table 6: Long term debt percent and rm survival
Bond nance Asian crisis Global nancial crisis Exchange rate vol
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ltd -0.112*** -0.104** -0.082** -0.039**
(-2.90) (-2.26) (-2.40) (-2.15)
Ltd*ASCD 0.229***
(2.68)
ASCD 0.070***
(6.35)
Ltd*GFCD -0.057
(-1.14)
GFCD 0.071***
(8.35)
Ltd*V ol 0.098***
(2.75)
V ol 0.0002***
(9.38)
Leverage 0.148*** 0.137*** 0.142*** 0.133***
(5.26) (4.57) (6.12) (4.75)
Profitability -0.155*** -0.172*** -0.239*** -0.189***
(-3.51) (-3.90) (-6.44) (-4.30)
Investment -0.043* -0.041* -0.004 -0.029*
(-2.00) (-1.72) (-0.98) (-1.87)
Collateral -0.042** -0.053*** -0.022* -0.081*
(-2.15) (-3.26) (-1.83) (-1.81)
Size -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.46) (-4.38) (-7.35) (-4.05)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0001
(-4.22) (-2.71) (-2.89) (1.12)
GDP -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*
(-6.96) (8.05) (-13.26) (-1.91)
Observations 21,438 21,438 21,438 21,438
P   values of
test statistics
Wald 0.005 0.012 0.000 0.001
Anderson 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.385 0.631 0.225 0.289
Notes: Marginal eects of endogenous probit models are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a
rm fails in year t, and zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant
at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Also, see notes to Table 1.
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